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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STA1
1
E OF UTAH, I 
Plalintiff-Respondent, 
-vs.-
LARENZO EUGEAN PARK, 
Def endoot-A ppella;nt. ) 
Case 
No.10270 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The appellant Larenzo Eugean Park has appealed 
from his conviction of the crime of negligent homicide 
in violation of Section 41-6-43.10, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was tried on the crime alleged in the 
information before the Honorable Merrill K. Faux, 
Judge, setting without jury. Upon a full presentation 
of the evidence, the court found the appellant guilty and 
1 
imposed a sentence within the permissible limits as pro. 
vided by statute. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the decision of the trial 
court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent submits the following statement of 
facts and submits that it is more in keeping with the rule 
that the decision of the trial court on appeal will be 
viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict rendered. 
The appellant was tried on the crime of automobile 
homicide for the death of Milton Clyde McMillan on the 
31st day of January, 1964. The accident in question oc-
curred in the vicinity of 4800 South and 1246 West, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah (R. 30, 40). Running east 
and west, 4800 South is a two-lane highway separated by 
dotted white lines (Exhibit 8). A crosswalk runs north 
and south at 1246 West. Two hundred feet west of the 
crosswalk is a black and white sign with the words 
"PEDESTRIAN LANE" (Exhibit 1). A street enters 4800 
South just west of the crosswalk. This is 1250 West. On 
the corner of 1250 West is an arc light and an arc light 
is also located east of 1250 West (R. 30). There are 
gravel shoulders on each side of 4800 South (R. 40, Ex· 
hibit 8). Immediately adjacent to the crosswalk is the 
Taylorsville Ward. At the time of the accident, 4800 
South was black-topped nnd was dry (R. 40). 
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At approximately 8 :45 p.m., the appellant, operat-
ing a borrowed vehicle in which his girl friend was rid-
ing, was traveling east on 4800 South (R. 196, 205). The 
appellant's vehicle passed two cars that had been in front 
of him as he approached the crosswalk at 1246 West. The 
appellant was familiar with the area and had driven past 
the Taylorsville Ward on previous occasions and was 
aware of its location (R. 205). Immediately after pass-
ing the two vehicles, the appellant pulled back into the 
righthand lane of traffic where he observed cars parked 
at an angle near the Taylorsville Ward and west of 
1250 West (R. 206). The deceased Milton Clyde McMil-
lan had apparently parked his car on the north side of 
4800 South and walked south towards the Taylorsville 
Ward through the crosswalk (R. 61). At a point ten 
feet from the gravelled shoulder on the south side of 
4800 South and directly in the center of the crosswalk, 
the deceased was struck by the appellant's vehicle (Ex-
hibit 8). The deceased was knocked and carried 140 feet 
east of the point of impact and came to rest four feet four 
inches from the north side of the roadway at 4800 South 
in the opposite lane of traffic. His shoes were found 
approximately 35 feet from the point of impact (R. 41, 
45). The appellant's vehicle left 135 feet of skid marks 
beginning from 1250 West, past the Taylorsville Ward, 
in an easterly direction (R. 45). The average skid mark 
from each of the wheels of the appellant's vehicle was 
approximately 129 feet. The deceased was struck directly 
in the center of the vehicle (Exhibits 6 and 9). The hood 
ornament of appellant's vehicle broke off, piercing the 
chest of deceased and lodging approximately five inches 
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in the chest (R. 45, 90). The deceased received compound 
fractures of both legs, broken ribs, head injuries and the 
fatal wound in the chest (R. 43, 89 to 90). As a result of 
the injuries sustained, Milton Clyde McMillan died. 
The speed limit in the area is 35 miles per hour. The 
surface of the road was dry and visibility was not ob. 
scured although it was dark. The area where the acei-
dent occurred was an area conjested with cars (R. 42). 
The crosswalk was marked with worn white paint (R. 42). 
A speed sign, indicating a speed limit of 35 miles an hour, 
was posted on the south side of 4800 South, two-tenths 
of a mile west of the pedestrian lane. The deceased had 
been dressed in dark clothing, with a white shirt, and was 
carrying a violin case, apparently to attend a dance which 
was to take place at the Taylorsville Ward (R. 84, Ex-
hibit 1). 
Mr. William S. Oxley, who resides immediately across 
the street from the Taylorsville Ward, was distracted by 
a motorcycle going up the road and glanced out of his 
window. He heard the impact of the car as it hit the 
deceased and at approximately the same time heard the 
brakes being applied (R. 36 and 37). This testimony was 
corroborated by other witnesses who were standing in 
the immediate area (R. 126). The appellant testified 
that he did not apply the brakes until after he had hit 
the deceased (R. 206, 207). 
Immediately subsequent to the accident, officers from 
the Salt Lake County sheriff's office performed brake and 
skid tests on the same road surface. At 35 miles per 
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hour, they were able to leave 53 feet of skid marks. 
Subsequently, sheriff's officers and officers from the 
Highway Patrol also performed skid tests on the same 
road. Based upon the skid tests performed by the sher-
iff's officers on the night in question, Sgt. Ed Pitcher of 
the Highway Patrol estimated the appellant's speed at a 
minimum of 63.8 miles per hour prior to application of 
the brakes. Based upon the tests performed subse-
quently, the speed of the appellant's vehicle was esti-
mated at a minimum of 53.845 miles per hour. The ap-
pellant and his girl friend both testified that they did not 
look at the speedometer before the accident (R. 201, 218). 
The appellant testified he did not see the 35 miles-per-
hour speed sign nor the sign advising of a pedestrian 
lane (R. 215). He further testified that as he approached 
the crosswalk, he did not look to the north, which was the 
direction the deceased was coming from (R. 216). The 
appellant estimated his speed between 35 and 40 miles 
an hour prior to the accident (R. 207). He further testi-
fied that he stopped within two car lengths after the im-
pact (R. 207). Based upon the above evidence, the trial 
court apparently found that the appellant operated his 
vehicle at a high rate of speed in a conjested area and 
failed to keep a proper lookout, thus evidencing a reck-
less disregard for the safety of others, and rendered a 
verdict of guilty. 
Subsequently, the appellant was sentenced to six 
months in the county jail and to a $500 fine. Although 
the Department of Probation and Parole recommended 
against probation because of the serious driving record 
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of the appellant (R. 13 through 15), the trial court 
granted the appellant probation upon the condition that 
he pay $250 of the fine and serve three months in jail. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO CON. 
VICT THE APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF 
NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. 
The appellant in Point I of his brief argues that 
the trial court should have dismissed the case at the end 
of the state's presentation of its evidence. In Point III 
of the appellant's brief, he argues that the evidence as 
presented, when all the testimony is considered, is insuf-
ficient to warrant a conviction. The respondent will 
answer the contentions of the appellant in one point. 
Since after the presentation of the state's evidence 
and after the appellant's motion to dismiss, the appellant 
went forward with additional evidence, the original re-
fusal to grant motion to dismiss has been waived and 
the only question for decision is whether upon all the 
evidence, the appellant's guilt has been shown. In 
Wigmore, Evidence, § 2496, it is stated: 
"Conversely, however, he cannot take advan· 
tage of the judge's original erroneous refusal to 
direct a verdict for insufficiency at the time of the 
first motion, (a) if he does not renew the motion at 
the close of all the evidence, or (b) or if at the 
time of the final motion the ruling correctly rr-
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fuses to order a verdict for insufficiency; for the 
Court is at that time entitled to decide upon a 
survey of the whole evidence; and this survey 
naturally renders any prior error immaterial." 
(Emphasis added) 
In State v. Denison, 352 Mo. 511, 178 S.W. 2d 449 (1944), 
the court said: 
"Since appellant did not stand on it (first de-
murrer) but presented evidence in his own behalf, 
the trial court was bound to take the latter evi-
dence into consideration insofar as it helped the 
State's case, in ruling on the second demurrer at 
the close of the whole case. 
It is apparent, therefore, that since appellant did not see 
fit to stand upon the evidence as presented by state but 
went forward and offered evidence in his own behalf, any 
failure of the trial court to dismiss the evidence at the 
end of the state's case has been waived and the sole 
question preserved on appeal is whether the evidence 
when taken as a whole justifies the conviction. 
Section 41-6-43.10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, pro-
vides for the standard applicable in negligent homicide 
cases. If a vehicle is driven "in reckless disregard of 
the safety of others'' and results in the death of a person, 
the individual so operating the vehicle may be guilty of 
negligent homicide. The individual need not intend to 
take the life of another person nor need he evidence a 
<lisregard for life in general. Recently in People v. Dun-
leacy, Court of Criminal Appeal of Eire, (1948) Irish Re-
ports 95, Justice Davitt explained the difference be-
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tween reckless disregard of life and reckless disregard 
of safety, stating: 
''To say a person is driving with a reckless 
disregard for life means that he does not care 
whether he kills anybody or not. Such a state of 
mind will ordinarily, but perhaps not universally, 
amount to general malice sufficient to justify a 
conviction for murder. To say that a person is 
driving with a reckless disregard for the safety 
of others, may mean no more than he does not care 
whether or not he puts them in danger. This may 
amount to no more than dangerous driving. To 
associate these two ideas is not to achieve the de. 
sired mean, but possibly to import an ambiguity. 
On the other hand, if the reference to recklessness 
is merely omitted, the jury are hardly given all the 
assistance which they are entitled to expect." 
He concluded, relying upon Commonwealth v. W elansky, 
55 N.E. 902 (Mass.): 
''If the negligence proved is of a very high de-
gree and of such a character that any reasonable 
driver, endowed with ordinary road sense and in 
full possession of his faculties, would realize, if 
he thought at all, that by driving in the manner 
which occasioned the fatality he was, without law-
ful excuse, incurring, in a high degree, the risk of 
causing substantial personal injury to others, the 
crime of manslaughter appears clearly to be es· 
tablished. '' 
Statutes similar to 41-6-43.10 have been enacted in 
many states and a substantial number of countries fol· 
lowing common law tradition. See Shannon, llfotor Ve· 
hicle Offences, p. 329 etc. (Can. 1964). This court has 
heretofore indicated that reckless disregard of the safety 
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of others requires more than inadvertence but does not 
require a wilful nor malignant act. Rash inadvertence 
or heedlessness may suffice. Thus, in State v. Berchtold, 
11 U. 2d 208, 357 P. 2d 183 (1960), this court, in address-
ing itself to the standard required by the negligent homi-
cide statute, stated: 
""' "' • Our statute only requires reckless disre-
gard for the safety of others, which is a much 
greater lack of care than ordinary negligence, but 
does not require as great a consciousness of the 
danger confronted as wilful misconduct required 
to create civil liability under our guest statute. 
To be 'reckless' does not require 'wilfulness' but 
means rather heedless, careless, and rash inad-
vertence to consequences.'' 
In the Berchtold case this court recognized that the 
standard was similar to that discussed in State v. Ling-
man, 97 Utah 180, 91 P. 2d 457 ( 1939). In that case the 
defendant was charged with manslaughter for operating 
his vehicle at a high speed in a residential district, re-
sulting in a collision which killed the driver of another 
automobile. The court noted, on page 204 of Utah Re-
ports, that going at a speed of forty miles an hour in a 
residential area and failing to keep a proper lookout 
would support the necessary lack of due care and cir-
cumspection, such that an instruction, under the man-
slaughter statute that the jury could convict if it so found 
the facts, would be appropriate. The court noted at page 
200 of Utah Reports : 
''"' " " But if the jury finds that such speed might 
produce death (which it well might), then he is 
guilty of manslaughter, if in addition he did not 
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carefully watch the roa<l and for that reason an 
accident occurred.'' 
It is apparent, therefore, from the above cases that 
conduct closely paralleling that of appellant's in the in-
stant case will suffice to sustain a conviction, since such 
actions evidence the criminal negligence required by the 
statute. In the instant case, taking the facts in a light 
most favorable to the trial court's judgment, it appears 
that the appellant was operating his vehicle at a speed 
of up to 63 miles an hour in a residential zone. The 
roadway was a two-lane highway, not well lighted. Thus, 
the necessity for caution and circumspection on the part 
of appellant was greater. The appellant failed to see a 
speed sign, a pedestrian lane and a pedestrian-lane sign. 
He failed to see the deceased by his own statement until 
after he ha<l struck him. He had traveled in the area of 
4800 South on previous occasions and was aware that 
there was a church in the vicinity as well as the fact that 
it was a residential neighborhood through which he was 
traveling. He saw cars lined up at a 45° angle near the 
church. Under these circumstances, it is apparent that 
the appellant failed to keep a proper lookout and in fart 
failed to use that caution that a reasonable driver "en-
dowed with ordinary road sense'' would use. The appel-
lant's vehicle knocked the deceased some 140 feet. Ac-
cording to witnesses, the deceased literally flew through 
the air. The appellant's vehicle laid down 1:-3.J fort of 
skid marks. In this case, the evidence clearly discloses 
that appellant's conduct was a callous disregard of the 
dangerous circumstances that any reasonable man would 
have appreciated. The driving of a motor vehicle at an 
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excessive and high rate of speed is negligence in many 
circumstances, State v. Lingman, supra, but driving at 
an excc~ssive and high rate of speed in a residential area, 
disregarding warning signs and other circumstances 
which would put a person on notice of the possibility of 
the harm to others, is driving in reckless disregard for 
the safety of others. Here the appellant passed two cars 
immediately before entering the conjested area where the 
accident occurred. He traveled at a high rate of speed. 
He failed to fully examine the road in front of him. He 
failed to appreciate the likelihood of persons being in 
the area. He failed to observe the speed limit and warn-
ing signs. He was, without doubt, guilty of failing to 
exercise care for the safety of others. 
In People v. Black, 111 Cal. App. 90, 295 P. 87 (1931), 
the court, affirming a conviction for manslaughter for 
driving a vehicle in such a wilful or wanton manner as 
to disregard the safety of other persons, held that where 
the defendant at half past eight in the evening drove his 
automobille across a poorly lighted blind-street inter-
section at a speed in excess of 15 miles per hour, struck 
a pedestrian at a crossing and skidded some 64 feet after 
he had applied the brakes, was properly convicted based 
on recklessness. Commonwealth v. Godshalk, 76 Pa. 
Super. 500 (1921), held that where an individual drove 
his vehicle at 35 miles an hour past a stop sign and struck 
a pedestrian walking on the highway, the driver's con-
duct was reckless. In Commonwealth v. Eck, 1 Lycom-
ing 23 (Pa. 1949), the defendant drove at a high rate of 
speed in a congested area, struck two boys on a bicycle 
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and left long skid marks. The court found the conduct 
tantamount to recklessness. In People v. Lett, 77 Cal. 
App. 2d 917, 177 P. 2d 417, the court sustained a convic-
tion of manslaughter under a statute similar to the pre-
vious Utah manslaughter statute, where the defendant 
struck the decedent in a crosswalk and where he did not 
sound his horn or stop although he was blinded by on-
coming lights. In People v. Flores, 83 Cal. App. 2d 11, 
187 P. 2d 410 (1947), the defendant was convicted of 
having caused the death of a human being by his gross 
neglect in driving a vehicle. The defendant, traveling 
at a speed of 50 to 60 miles an hour in a residential area 
of Los Angeles, passed a car, struck a man in the vicinity 
of an intersection, throwing him into the air, and con-
tinued on. The court stated: 
'' • • • and where a driver did not see his vic-
tim until the instant of impact or not at all, he is 
guilty of gross negligence or of an entire indiffer-
ence to those who were using the street or high-
ways simultaneously with him.'' 
In Regina v. Jeffers, 7 Criminal Law Quarterly 243, 
(C. C. Nova Scotia 1963), the defendant was convicted of 
driving his vehicle in a manner dangerous to the public, 
having regard to the circumstances of the accident, in 
viola ti on of ~ 22 1 ( 4) of the Canadian Criminal Code. The 
defendant struck a boy on a bicycle while traveling at a 
speed of 45 to 50 miles an hour in Halifax County in the 
evening. In sustaining the conviction, in a long and care-
fully analyzed opinion, the court gave consideration to 
Canadian, American and English cases and found that in 
view of the circumstances, the nature of the danger in-
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volved, the appellant's conduct was seriously dangerous 
to the public under the circumstances. See also Regina v. 
Beck, 7 Criminal Law Quarterly 370 (C. C. Nova Scotia 
1964), where the court sustained a conviction where the 
individual drove at a speed of 55 to 60 miles an hour in a 
residential area of Hal if ax. 
It is apparent, therefore, that the evidence in this 
case is sufficient to sustain a conviction when viewed 
against the facts involved and the breadth of precedence 
dealing with similar statutes. 
The appellant can take no comfort from the fact 
that deceased was dressed in dark clothing or was a small 
man. Small men have as much right on the highway as 
large men. 
Further, there is no showing that the appellant 
even saw the man until he struck him although there was 
substantial indication from the surrounding circum-
stances that should have caused him to anticipate the pos-
sible presence of others. Even so, in State v. Husby, 102 
Utah 416, 131 P. 2d (1942), this court sustained a convic-
tion for manslaughter resulting from the death of a per-
son in a crosswalk even though the defendant had the 
green light. The court noted that the contributory neg-
ligence of the deceased, if any, would not be a defense in 
the face of criminal negligence. 




THE TRIAL COURT COl\IMlTTED NO ER. 
ROR IN REJECTING THE TESTIMONY OF 
MR. HARVEY FLORENCE, A WITNESS FOR 
THE DEFENDAN'l1 • 
Subsequent to the time of trial, the court indicated 
that he could not give credence to the testimony of ~Ir. 
Harvey Florence, a witness who testified for the defend-
ant. 1\Ir. Florence's testimony was inconsistent to somp 
extent with the testimony of other witnesses. He testi-
fied that in his opinion the appellant was traveling no 
faster than 40 miles per hour. Contrary to the inference 
in appellant's brief, Mr. Florence based his opinion only 
on the speed he observed subsequent to the impact, after 
observing the squeal of appellant's brakes, and from thP 
time of impact to the time of stop (R. 161). The appel-
lant's contention is that the trial court did not have the 
prerogative to reject Mr. Florence's testimony unless he 
had an interest of some pecuniary nature in the litiga-
tion or some relationship to a party, or other property 
interest in the litigation (Appellant's Brief, p. 17). The 
trial court indicated that he did not believe the testimony 
of Mr. Florence because of his demeanor of the stand, his 
argumentative nature and his apparent interest in forc-
ing the court to accept his views. The trial court indi-
cated that he felt he could believe one witness against 
many and could take into consideration the demeanor of 
the witness and his appearance on the stand. The appel-
















It is well settled that a court may consider the bias 
of a witness, including his friendly feeling towards a 
party, his hostility, self-interest, or other matters which 
tend to detract from his testimony. McCormick, Evi-
dence, § 40 (1954). It was the duty of the court to ap-
praise the testimony of Mr. Florence, based on his con-
sistency with other testimony and other evidence. It is 
further the court's prerogative to discount Mr. Flor-
ence's testimony if he found that it was in part false or 
if the demeanor of the witness was such that he believed 
he was not being accurate or telling the whole truth. In 
58 Am. Jur., Witnesses,§ 865, p. 494, it is stated: 
'"' • • It is proper for the jury to take into 
account a witness' interest, bias, or prejudice, his 
character, conduct, or habits, the falseness of his 
testimony in part, the appearance, manner, and 
demeanor of the witness while testifying, his ap-
parent frankness and intelligence, his capacity 
for consecutive narration of acts and events, the 
probability or improbability of the story related 
by him, the advantage he appears to have had for 
gaining accurate information on the subject, and 
the accuracy or retentiveness of his memory as 
well as the lapse of time affecting it." 
11his court has clearly recognized that the above are 
proper factors to be weighed by a jury or the trier of fact 
in reaching a verdict. 
In Gittens v. Lundberg, 3 U 2d 392, 284 P. 2d 1115 
( 1953), this court observed : 
"It is the duty of this court to leave the ques-
tion of credibility of witnesses to the jury or fact 
trier and we have quite consistently adhered to 
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that policy. As has often been said, the jury i~ 
in a favored position to form impressions as to 
the trust to be reposed in witnesses. They have 
the advantage of fairly close personal contact; the 
opportunity to observe appearance and general 
demeanor; and the chance to feel the impact of 
personalities. All of which they may consider in 
connection with the reactions, manner of expres. 
sion, and apparent frankness and candor or want 
of it in reacting to and answering questions 011 
both direct and cross-examination in determinin~ 
whether, and to what extent, witnesses are to be 
believed.'' 
It is apparent, therefore, that the trial court actecl 
properly in dismissing the testimony of a witness which 
he felt was not credible. Further, to the extent that the 
court had before it good and sufficient evidence for its 
verdict, it is well established that this court will not inter-
fere merely because from the dry record on appeal, it 
appears that the testimony of a witness might have 
merit. Most recently, in Carling v. Industrial Commis· 
sion, et al., No. 10177, February 19, 1965, this court 
observed: 
"• • • A reversal because of an erroneous state-
ment by the Commission would be justified only 
if it appeared that it was so mistaken in fact or 
law that in its absence there would be a reasonable 
likelihood of a different result." 
In Walker v. Peterson, 3 U. 2d 54, 278 P. 2d 291 (1954), 
this court further observed: 
"It is true generally that statements made hy 
a trial judge do not necessarily affect the validity 
of a judgment if it is otherwise sustainable." 
16 
From the above authorities, it is manifestly appar-
ent that the appellant's position, that the trial court had 
a mandatory duty to afford full weight to Mr. Florence's 
testimony, is without foundation in law. The trial court 
had the full advantage of seeing Mr. Florence, gauging 
his responsiveness to the questions asked, weighing his 
credibility and resolving the evidence that he gave 
against other testimony with which it might conflict. 
The trial court found that the testimony of Mr. Florence 
was not to be accorded weight. This was well within 
the discretion of the trial court and presents no basis for 
relief on appeal. 
POINT III 
THE SENTENCE OF THE TRIAL COURT 
SHOULD BE SUSTAINED ON APPEAL 
SINCE (a) THE ISSUE IS MOOT, AND (b) 
THE SENTENCE WAS OTHERWISE WITH-
IN THE POWER OF THE COURT. 
In Point IV of Appellant's Brief, it is argued that 
the court erred in sentencing the def end ant. The sen-
tence of the court was that the appellant be confined in 
the county jail for six months and pay a fine of $500. 
That sentence was suspended upon condition that appel-
lant voluntarily submit himself to confinement in the 
county jail for three months and pay a fine of $250. Sec-
tion 41-6-43.lO(b) provides: 
"(b) Any person convicted of negligent homi-
cide shall be punished by imprisonment in the 
county jail for not more than one year or by fine 
of not less than $100 nor more than $1,000, or by 
both such fine and imprisonment.'' 
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Thus, the sentence as imposed and as reduced upon a 
term of probation was well within the legal limits which 
the statute authorized. 
The appellant contends that the sentence as imposed 
deprived him of a right to appeal. This argument is a11 
obvious absurdity. The case is now before the court on 
appeal and the sentence has not been changed. The trial 
court in no way conditioned the sentence upon the appe\. 
lant foregoing his appellate rights. Such a condition 
was not even alluded to. The sentence of three months in 
the county jail and a fine of $250 is still the sentence of 
the trial court and the appellant may still accept these 
terms as conditions to probation. As a consequence, so 
much of the appellant's argument that the sentence d~­
prived him of a right to appeal is without merit. Further, 
since the appellant has in fact appealed and apparently 
without prejudice to the original sentence, the argument 
is moot. 
Additionally, the appellant argues that the proba-
tionary condition, that the appellant serve three months 
in the county jail and pay a fine of $250, is illegal because 
it goes beyond the standard of good behavior. The appel-
lant has cited no case to the effect that good behavior is 
the only condition upon which probation can be imposed. 
To the contrary, the law knows no such limitation. It j, 
generally that conditions of probation are unrestricted 
except that a condition which is illegal, immoral or im-
possible may not be imposed. See State v. Harris, llfi 
Kan. 387, 226 P. 715 (1924); 39 Am. Jnr., Pardon, 87. It 
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fs generally the rule of law that any condition of proba-
tion which is within the original power of the court to 
impose as part of the sentence is valid. See Rubin, et al., 
The Law of Criminal Correction, p. 197 to 204; 24 C.J.S., 
Criminal Law, 1571(8). 
Section 77-35-17, Utah Code Annotated 1953, allows 
the court to suspend a sentence and place the individual 
on probation. The court in effect has done this in this 
instance by either (a) suspending all the sentence and 
imposing a fine and sentence as part of probation, which 
is permissible (24 C.J.S., Criminal Law, 1571(8), p. 475), 
or merely suspending part of the sentence, which is also 
permissible. In the instant case, the conditions of pro-
bation were substantially less than the original sentence 
that could have been imposed by the court. They were in 
110 way in excess of the court's power and, therefore, were 
neither illegal, immoral or impossible of performance. 
It must be concluded that the sentence of appellant 
was proper in all respects. 
CONCLUSION 
'rhe evidence in the instant case clearly demonstrates 
that the appellant was guilty of the crime as charged. 
'rhe appellant displayed a reckless disregard for the 
safety of others and operated his motor vehicle in a man-
1wr which brought death to an otherwise innocent citizen. 
The carnage on the highways of the State of Utah 
and the nation in general is a problem that has warranted 
consideration by the legislatures of the states and the 
courts who are charged with enforcing the law. Had the 
appellant merely chosen to obey the rules and regulations 
prescribed for the operation of motor vehicles on the 
highways of the State of Utah and had he shown the care 
and concern for the safety of others instead of the heed-
less, reckless indifference he displayed, the crime would 
not have occurred and this appeal would not have taken 
place. The evidence before the trial court was more than 
sufficient to prove the appellant's guilt. 
The other arguments urged for reversal are at best 
frivolous. This court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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